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Abstract 
 
This paper contributes to the understanding of value within the service science and 
management literature, a literature that currently defines and measures value in various ways, 
making assumptions about how value is created and judged. We present this paper in two 
parts: in the first, we reprise six core themes of value understanding in the management 
literature, highlighting their implicit philosophical, chronological and consciousness 
assumptions; in the second, we elaborate on consciousness and discuss the implications of a 
consciousness assumption on the understanding of value in Service Science and management 
literature in general. 
  
By applying theories on information processing, we reinterpret two types of value 
consciousness: a phenomenal and an access consciousness. We propose that different 
information processing systems are in operation in a phenomenal consciousness of value 
(active in the raw experience) than in an access consciousness of value (active pre- or post-
experience). In so doing, suggesting consumer consciousness of value is different at 
consumption than at choice, and challenging the consciousness assumption implicit in the 
extant value literature. 
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Introduction 
 
In 2006, Chesbrough and Spohrer put forward the ‘Grand Challenge’ of service science, a ‘call to 
action’ to the academic community to address the changing needs of the economy. They 
advocated creating a discipline based on an interdisciplinary approach to the study, design, and 
implementation of service systems, a dynamic configuration of resources - people, technology, 
organizations and shared information - that create value between provider and customer 
through service (IfM and IBM, 2008). As such, value and its co-creation are central to the study 
of service science (Maglio et al., 2010). Yet despite its central focus, the term value carries 
meaning in many disciplines resulting in numerous definitions and much debate on how it 
should be defined and measured (Anderson and Narus, 1998). Perhaps it is not surprising then 
that Ostrom et al. (2010) found one of the key priorities for progressing service science 
research to be knowledge for measuring and optimising service value. In essence, calling for an 
investigation into how firms should approach the creation, delivery and measurement of value 
between provider and customer through service. 
  
Service Science takes its approach to value from the Service-Dominant Logic (Maglio et al., 
2010, Spohrer and Maglio, 2008, Vargo et al., 2008), a reasoning based on thinking in 
management and economic literatures. As a result we turn to the concept of value in  
management literature, which generally refers to the judgment of the ‘goodness’ of something; 
be it a person, an idea, a product, an activity or anything else physically external to either a 
person or an entity like a firm. 
  
Understanding value 
As stated, value holds many meanings and definitions across disciplines, giving rise to 
fragmented streams of thought in management literature on what value is, how it is created, 
‘delivered’ and ‘consumed’. Various authors have reviewed the literature, identifying these 
streams and seeking to assimilate their perspectives (see Payne and Holt, 2001, Khalifa, 2004, 
Lindgreen and Wynstra, 2005, Ng and Smith, 2012). In this paper, we first reprise the six themes 
of value understanding in literature and their philosophical, chronological and consciousness 
assumptions highlighted by Ng and Smith (2012); and second, we discuss the implications of the 
consciousness assumption for value in Service Science and management literature in general. 
 
The six themes of value understanding in the literature are categorised as: utility; monetary 
worth, perceived satisfaction; net benefit, means-end and phenomenological. Table 1 
summarises the assumptions. 
  
Utility is a foundation of economics; through its influence on exchange theory it has had a 
significant impact on management science. It is understood to be the usefulness or satisfaction 
from consumption, represented through a person’s preference. Although it is not seen as 
something that can be directly measured, it is considered to be comparable and relative. It 
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therefore can be determined through revealed preferences, trade-offs and willingness to pay 
(see for example von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, Fishburn, 1970, Anand, 1993) 
  
In management literature there are two dominant understandings of value: a provider-centric 
interpretation, which views the value of the customer to the firm; and a customer-centric 
interpretation, which views value as a preferential judgment as seen by the customer.  Within 
the provider-centric view there is a stream of literature which literally sees customer value as 
the economic worth of the customer to the firm, often over the customer’s lifetime of 
purchase from the firm (see for example Haenlein et al., 2006, Hooper et al., 2001, Lewis, 2006, 
Reichheld and Sasser Jr, 1990). In the other provider-centric stream, the value of the customer 
to the firm is less literal but nonetheless something which is determined by the firm. It 
considers value to be the customer’s perceived satisfaction of the firm’s offering. Perceived 
satisfaction is measured or assessed based on the disconfirmation model in consumer 
behaviour, which states that a customer is satisfied, i.e. perceives the offering to be of value, 
when the product’s performance is equal to what was expected at purchase (Oliver, 1997, Rust 
and Oliver, 2000). An ability to deliver superior value, or in other words exceed expectation, 
results in advantage for the firm (Liu et al., 2005, Payne and Holt, 2001, Ulaga and Eggert, 2006) 
  
Within the customer-centric view there are two principal models of value judgment; net benefit 
and means-end. The net-benefit models view perceived value as the net difference between 
the benefits and the sacrifices associated with acquiring and consuming an offering (e.g. Butz 
and Goodstein, 1996, Naumann, 1995, Gronroos, 1997). On the other hand, the means-end 
model views perceived value as the evaluation of offerings as a means towards a use goal; each 
offering has a different set of attributes and attribute performances which will be perceived to 
have different consequences in use (e.g. Flint and Woodruff, 2001, Flint et al., 2002, Woodruff, 
1997). So, while in the net-benefit model, value rests in the evaluation of an outcome i.e. ‘what 
I get for what I give’, in the means-end model, it rests in the evaluation of offerings attributes in 
terms of their suitability for the individual’s goals. 
  
The final stream, like the customer-centric view, reflects upon the judgment of value as relative, 
comparable and subjective but recognises its creation as phenomenological, that is to say it is 
created in the interaction or relationship between the item and the perceiver (e.g. Holbrook, 
1994, 2006, Pine and Gilmore, 1998). 
Three Implicit Assumptions of Value definitions 
We categorise these six streams of understanding, and propose that each should be considered 
a ‘special case’ of value, upheld based on some implicit assumptions. We identify three key 
implicit assumptions and elaborate on them below. 
We refer to the first as a philosophical assumption on where value is created and it relates to 
whether value is considered to have been created when an offering is created i.e. it resides in 
the offering to be extracted (or not) in use; or whether value is created in the use experience.  
The former is often linked to a goods-dominant, manufacturing or old enterprise logic (Vargo 
and Lusch, 2004, 2008, Normann, 2001, Chandler and Vargo, 2011). Under this logic, value is 
considered to be created by the producer through a series of activities, the output of which is 
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distributed to the consumer through an exchange in the marketplace. It implies the company 
embeds value in the offering, be it tangible or intangible, by transforming raw materials and 
activities into something that customers will exchange money for. The value then is seen as the 
essence of an offering and is measured through its worth in the exchange transaction. The 
value, embedded in the offering they have purchased, is then consumed or destroyed in use. 
This is an atomistic view, whereby the value of an offering exists as a steady ‘essence’ even if it 
is open to subjective perception. For example, perceived satisfaction literature proposes that a 
customer is satisfied when the product’s performance is equal to what was expected; if the 
product's performance exceeds expectations, the customer is very satisfied, if it remains below 
expectations, the customer will be dissatisfied. Although a judgment of satisfaction is based on 
subjective expectation, there is an assumption that the offering has an inherent value and 
therefore a firm can promise satisfaction. 
  
The alternative philosophical assumption is a phenomenological perspective on value creation, 
viewing value of an offering as created only through its use within a dynamically constructed 
context. This context is the use environment and it shapes the actions, practices and processes 
of use. Further, the context effects and is effected by the customer themselves though their 
agency (i.e. their capacity to achieve their goals) and their resources (i.e. their skills and 
competencies). Holbrook (1994, 2006) takes a phenomenological view, describing value as (1) 
interactive, in that it involves a relationship between some subject and some object, and (2) 
relative, because it is comparative, situational and personal. This notion of value as practices 
and processes enacted within a dynamically constructed context is dominant in Service 
Dominant Logic and Service Science.  To better articulate the idea that value is co-created in a 
particular context, the term value-in-context was introduced in the value co-creation and 
service science literature (Vargo et al., 2008). 
  
The principal difference between the atomistic and phenomenological philosophical 
assumptions is that in the former, value sits in the ‘noun’ to be subjectively perceived and 
consumed; in the latter, it sits in the ‘verbs’ to be enacted and practiced in use. The implication 
of an atomistic assumption is that it may underestimate the actions, practices and interactions 
that create the experience of an offerings use in context. 
  
The second implicit assumption of value definition is a temporal or chronological assumption. 
It presumes that value is consistent across purchase, consumption and evaluation. For instance, 
in utility theory, like perceived satisfaction literature, an exchange is considered successful 
when the ‘utility’ received is that which has been stipulated as the terms of the exchange 
(Houston and Gassenheimer, 1987). Therefore, satisfaction is relative to what was defined at 
purchase. This implicitly assumes that what represents value in the context of a purchase is the 
same value in the context of consumption i.e. the offering generates the same utility in both 
time-space contexts. The limitation of this assumption is that it does not recognize the 
phenomenological nature of value at consumption and that value could change if the context of 
consumption changes. This implies that satisfaction in use may not be the same as what was 
expected at purchase because the customer’s context, agency and resources have changed, 
despite the offering being ‘delivered’ exactly as promised at purchase. 
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The final implicit assumption of value definition, related to the chronological assumption, is the 
assumption of consciousness. If we take the position that value is phenomenologically created 
in experience and in context (i.e. the Service-Dominant Logic approach), instead of it being 
atomistic and residing in the offering, we also need to consider how, when and where do 
individuals become conscious of the value created. In other words, if we take value creation as 
creating something ‘good’ i.e. of value as emerging from the use and experience of an offering, 
the consciousness of that goodness during the phenomenological experience may be different 
from the consciousness of that goodness imagined before, or evaluated after, the use or 
experience of the offering. One can even argue that within the use/experience phenomenon, 
the individual is merely ‘in practice’ of resource integrating, with a lower level consciousness of 
what is ‘good’, or what is of ‘value’, from the resources being integrated within the 
phenomenon. In other words, even if value is uniquely created within a phenomenon, there 
could possibly be two levels of consciousness of that value that could exist at different times. 
We propose two levels of consciousness of value at different times: A phenomenologically 
conscious value, the raw experience of creating value through interactions in the use 
experience; and an access consciousness of value, the perception, introspection and memory of 
the experience before and after use.  
The remainder of this paper discusses the implications of the consciousness assumption for 
literature on value. 
Background to Consciousness 
P-Conscious and A-Conscious (Block, 1995; 1999) 
According to Block (1995), computational approach human mind (including consciousness) can 
be understood through the notions of “information processing, computation and function in a 
system” (p.9). ‘Cognitive computation’ entails a class of synthetic methods highly suited for 
advancing the science of consciousness (Seth, 2009, p.50).  Computation is described as 
‘mechanistic processes’ for explanation of the mechanistic basis of consciousness and its 
mechanistic roles (or functions) in the human mind for understanding ‘the physical basis of 
mental activities and phenomenal experiences’ (Sun, 1999, p.3).  In order to analyse 
consciousness in terms of its underlying mechanisms, we need to first identify its functions it 
may play in a cognitive system (Cleeremans, 2005, p.9).  Block (1995) distinguishes between 
access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. 
  
Access (A)-consciousness refers to our ability to report and act on our experience (Cleeremans, 
2004, p.9) by focusing on the ‘control of speech, reasoning and action’ (Block, 1995, p.6).   A-
conscious content could include ‘ inner speech and usually a sense of agency, self and a 
subjective first-person perspective on the world’ (Seth, 2009, p.51). For a person to be in an A-
conscious state there is a representation for free use in reasoning and for direct rational control 
of action (Block, 1995, p.5) and ‘for high-level processes such as conscious judgment, reasoning, 
planning and guiding of action’ (Cleeremans, 2005, p.10).  A –consciousness is: (1) cognitive, in 
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that it involves "propositional attitude" like thoughts, beliefs and desires; (2) functional, in that 
it is definable in terms of a computer programme; and (3) intentional, in that a representation 
or state with representational content expressed by "that" clauses’ (Block, 1995, p.10).  It is 
suggested that conscious representations in A-consciousness is characterised by its ‘global 
accessibility’, i.e. informationally available to multiple systems. Accessibility is viewed as serving 
the function of making it possible for an agent to exert flexible, adaptive control over action 
(Cleeremans, 2005, p.10). 
  
Phenomenal (P) –consciousness refers to the ‘qualitative nature of the subjective experience’ 
(Cleeremans, 2005, p.11) and entails experiential properties such as ‘sensations, feelings and 
perceptions, but also… thoughts, wants and emotions’ (Block, 1995, p.2). 
 ‘What it is like to smell a particular scent, to feel a particular pain, to remember the emotions 
associated with a particular event, to be a bat chasing insects at nightfall’ (Cleeremans, 2005, 
p.11). These properties ‘are distinct from any cognitive, intentional and functional properties’. 
However, this is not to say that P-conscious content has no intentional aspect, just that it may 
be represented in a primitive non-intentional way (Block, 1995, p.3).  P-consciousness is 
conscious experience (Cleeremans, 2005). In terms of the functions of P-consciousness, some 
argue that they are purely epiphenomenal and hence play no causal role in information 
processing’ (e.g. O’Regan and Noe, 2001; Dennett, 1991; 2001) (Cleeremans, 2005, p.11).  
‘More generally, the function of conscious experience is to associate  emotional valence to the 
consequence of one’s actions’ (Cleeremans, 2005, p.11). 
  
Block (1995) suggests that ‘the content of an experience can be both P-conscious and A-
conscious (p.8).  P-conscious content could consist of ‘phenomenal aspects such as perceptual 
experiences (e.g. redness), bodily sensations (e.g. itchiness), emotional reactions (e.g. regret) 
and moods (e.g. boredom)’ (Seth, 2009, p.51).  The P-conscious entails mainly ‘the phenomenal 
feel’: ‘the phenomenal character of an experience as of red consists in the experience 
representing something as red.  These representational contents are usually supposed to be 
‘non-conceptual’, as distinct from the content of thoughts. …’  (Block, 1999, p.41). ‘If P-content 
is non-conceptual, it may be said that P contents are not the right sort of thing to play a role in 
inference and guiding action’ (Block, 1995, p.10).   The non-conceptual representational 
content can be conceptualized and transferred by the concept users when they think with such 
content (Block, 1999, p. 41).  Thus, in this situation, a P-conscious state is also A-conscious state 
(Block, 1995, p.10).  A-conscious content is characterized by the ‘representational properties’ 
(Block, 1995, p.8). 
The relative dominance of the A-consciousness or P-consciousness depends on if the system is 
in charge of rational control of action and speech.  When this system is not in charge, we can 
suggest that the A-consciousness is missing.  In this situation, the P-consciousness will affect the 
actions and another system exerts influence on individual actions (experiential system). 
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Consciousness and value models 
We can now elaborate phenomenological value from our understanding of consciousness.  P-
consciousness entails primarily the experiential properties. In contrast, A-consciousness focuses 
entail states including thoughts, beliefs and desires.  Ng and Smith (2012) has proposed that 
experiential value within phenomenal experiences centres on experiential properties, which are 
associated with P-consciousness.  Thus, experiential value could be termed as a P-
Consciousness of Value (P-C-V) and we argue that P-C-V is associated with P-consciousness 
only. In contrast, the perceived value, utility, satisfaction of the offering in mainstream 
management value literature could be associated thoughts, attitude and beliefs, which could be 
linked to either A-consciousness or P-consciousness.  Thus, the cognitive value could be termed 
as A-Consciousness of Value (A-C-V).  A-C-V could be associated with both A-consciousness and 
P-consciousness.   
From the process model for consciousness, the functions of mind /consciousness is to ‘integrate 
inputs from domain specific modules and to make this information available to executive 
systems. ..to make its contents available to conscious awareness’ (Cleeremans, 2005, p.16).   In 
this system, the function of A-consciousness is to deal with the ‘...informational relations 
among modules’ (Block, 1995, p.9).  The A-conscious module refers to the executive module in 
the executive system. In contrast, P-conscious does not play a causal role in information 
processing.   According to Block (1995), one component of the conception of 
mind/consciousness is information processing in the executive system.  In this system, A-
consciousness may play the functions for dealing with the informational relations among 
modules.  When A-consciousness (executive module) is associated with A-C-V, the content of A-
C-V would function for dealing with the relations among the modules in the executive system.  
When P-Consciousness is associated with A-C-V, A-C-V would not have the function as an 
executive module in the executive system.   A-C-V would not be in operation for consumers 
making the logical reasoning.  An alternative system would play the role in actions, which relies 
on unconsciousness, the experiential system. 
In summary, we can suggest that P-C-V would be associated with P-consciousness and A-C-V 
would be associated with A-consciousness and/or P-consciousness.  The P-C-V would play the 
role in consumer actions only if the P-consciousness is in operation (relying more on 
unconsciousness).  When the A-C-V would affect consumer actions would depend on which 
consciousness it would be associated with.  When the A-C-V is associated with the A-
consciousness, the A-C-V would play the role of dealing with the modules in the executive 
system for actions and judgments.  When the A-C-V is associated with the P-consciousness, the 
A-C-V could only affect consumer actions when the A-consciousness is missing.  Therefore, in 
order to understand the operation of P-C-V or A-C-V, we need to gain more insights into the 
situations when the P-Conscious and A-conscious would be in operation. 
Information processing systems and P/A- Consciousness 
According to the process approach to the conception of consciousness, one aspect is referred 
to as information processing (Block. 1995).  The executive system described in the notion of 
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consciousness (Block, 1995; Cheeremans, 2005) consists of the executive modules and other 
domain specific modules (such as P-consciousness modules).  The executive system processes 
the information in a logical, rational manner and A-conscious content plays the role of dealing 
with the informational relations between modules.  We argue that this executive system is 
associated with the rational system of information processing.  In contrast, the executive 
system would not function when the A-conscious content is missing.  Human actions would rely 
on their unconsciousness and the experiential system would be in operation.  (See Table 2 for a 
summary of the characteristics of the two information processing systems).   
Low level of Experiential system, P-conscious , and P-C-V 
  
Leventhal (1994) suggests that ‘affective reactions can arise from two routes: an ‘innate-route’ 
accompanied by sensory-motor processes that generate primitive or partially formed affective 
reactions, and a memory route that involves schematic and conceptual processing’ (Shiv and 
Fedorikhin, 1999).  According to the theories, we propose that the experiential system could 
operate at both low and high levels. At the lower level, the operation of the experiential system 
could be automatic, affective and preconscious (unconscious). Epstein (1994) described the 
system at the lower level operation as: 
The experiential system is assumed to be intimately associated with the experience of 
affect, including vibes, which refer to the feeling of which people are often unaware. 
When a person responds to an emotionally significant event, the sequence of reactions is 
assumed to be as follows: the experiential system automatically search its memory bank 
for related events, including their emotional accomplishments. The recalled feelings 
influence the course of further processing and reactions… in humans, are conscious and 
unconscious thoughts as well as actions. If the activated feelings are pleasant, they 
motivate actions and thoughts anticipate to reproduce the feelings…’ (p.716). 
‘CEST assumes there is a ubiquitous influence of automatic thinking outside of 
awareness on conscious thinking and behavior. In most situations, the automatic 
processing of the experiential system is dominant over the rational system because it is 
less effortful and more efficient, and accordingly, the default option.  Moreover, because 
it is generally associated with affect, it is apt to be experienced as more compelling than 
is dispassionate logical thinking.  Finally, because the influence is usually outside of 
awareness, the rational system fails to control it because the person does not know 
there is anything to control’ (p.716). 
We would argue that the experiential system at the low level operation could be associated 
with P-consciousness.  We suggest that when the experiential processing system is in operation, 
P-consciousness is more dominant. The content of P-consciousness is either the experience or 
affect outside of consciousness.  It can be further suggested that when the experiential system 
is in operation, the P-C-V will be more dominant in terms of consumer information processing 
for making judgment or decisions for their actions. 
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Proposition one: When the low-level experiential system is in operation, P-C-V is dominant in 
consumer decision-making and action. 
High level of experiential system, P-consciousness and A-C-V 
At the high level, the experiential system could generalize and abstract to derive the prototype 
and schemata (Epstein, 1994). Thus, the experiential system could be a conceptual, conscious 
system including the rational thoughts but with cognitive shortcuts. At this level, heuristic 
processing is the experiential system in operation.  Heuristics exemplify the operation of the 
experiential system as a rapid, action-oriented system (Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992, p.534). 
Heuristic processing is described as ‘taking cognitive shortcuts when making inferences and 
forming judgments’. According to Operario and Fisk (1999), these cognitive short cuts include 
‘using schemas, scripts, stereotypes, and other simplifying perceptual tactics in place of careful 
thought...’ (p.66).    
P-consciousness entails primarily the experiential properties such as ‘sensations, feelings and 
perceptions...but also thoughts, wants and emotions’ (p.2).  In this context, the thoughts such 
as the perceived value, utility, satisfaction of the offering are in the form of schema or 
perceptual tactics.  When consumers do not make high cognitive efforts for processing the 
information, they would rely on their schema, prototype etc, the cognitive shortcuts, so we 
would argue that the cognitive A-C-V is still in operation. In this situation, even A-C-V could be 
associated with P-consciousness. The high level reach of the experiential system entails 
cognitive shortcuts, and acts as a rapid, action-oriented system by using schemas and other 
simplifying perceptual tactics in place of careful thought.  The A-C-V in the P-consciousness 
state would not require much cognitive effort to process.   
Proposition two: When the high level experiential system is in operation. A-C-V is dominant 
in consumer decision-making and action. 
 Rational system, A-Consciousness and A-C-V 
  
We suggest that when the rational processing system in operation, people would make an 
analytical effort to process the information and use their logic and the evidence for analyzing 
the cause and effect.  It can be argued that the rational system would be associated with the 
executive system of consciousness (Block, 1995).  In the executive system, the A-consciousness 
content as the executive module would deal with the information relations among modules in 
the system.  The perceived values, utility, satisfaction and the cognitive evaluations (A-C-V) 
would be processed by the system for consumer actions and judgments.  In our context, it can 
be further suggested that when the rational processing system is in operation, the A-C-Value 
will be the more dominant value model to affect consumer judgment and to guide consumer 
actions. 
Proposition three: When the rational system is in operation, A-C-V will be dominant in 
consumer decision-making and action. 
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In summary, the human consciousness system entails the dual information processing for 
processing their information.  When the experiential system is in operation, P-consciousness 
will be more dominant; in contrast, when the rational system is in operation, A-consciousness 
will be more effective in the process for integrating the inputs for raising the level of 
consciousness.  In the understanding of value, when P-consciousness is dominant, the P-C-V will 
be more important to affect consumer’s judgment and decision-making.  When A-
consciousness is more dominant, the A-C-V will be more effective to influence consumer 
behavior.  Thus, in order to understand the relationship between P-C-V and A-C-V, we need to 
understand the relationships between the experiential system and rational system and to 
understand the circumstances under which the information processing system is in operation. 
Proposition four: When the low-reach experiential system is not active, A-C-V will be 
dominant in consumer decision-making and action. 
Proposition five: When neither the high-reach experiential system and the rational system is 
active, P-C-V will be dominant in consumer decision-making and action. 
  
Discussion 
Service-Dominant Logic considers value as co-created in the use context, and of the six themes 
of value understanding identified in management literature - utility, monetary worth, perceived 
satisfaction, net benefit, means-end and phenomenological – Service-Dominant Logic takes a 
phenomenological perspective of value creation as that created in experience and in context. 
In doing so, it adopts a special case of value based on some implicit assumptions. First, by 
acknowledging value as unique, created in the practices and processes enacted within a 
dynamically constructed context, it adheres to a phenomenological philosophical assumption, 
treating value creation as a verb rather than a noun. Second, it assumes that exchange (i.e. 
consumer choice) includes an expectation of phenomenological value creation in use but does 
not articulate the relationship between creation of value in the experience and an assessment 
of that value at the point of choice when acquiring an offering. By not articulating this 
relationship it presumes that value is consistent across purchase, consumption and evaluation. 
Third, and related to the previous point, by taking a phenomenological value perspective, 
Service-Dominant Logic assumes that a customer’s awareness of value within the use 
experience is the same as their awareness of value ex-ante and ex-post judgment. In essence, 
assuming a customer’s consciousness of value at consumption is the same consciousness of 
value at choice. 
  
Whilst literature on the phenomenological perspective of value articulates the creation of 
value, it says little about how consumer perception of value should be measured, despite calls 
within the Service Science community to understand more about how value should be 
measured (e.g. Ostrom et al., 2010). Indeed, the other themes of value understanding, which 
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do discuss more in terms of measurement, largely take an atomistic philosophical perspective, 
in direct opposition to the phenomenological stance. As such, in order to understand how 
consumers evaluate perceived value of service offerings, researchers in service science aligned 
to Service-Dominant Logic need to understand more about the three assumptions in value 
literature – philosophical, chronological and consciousness. 
Our paper begins to address this point. Using Block’s (1995, 1999) notion of consciousness, we 
elaborate on consumer consciousness of value. We propose two states of consciousness; a 
phenomenal consciousness of value (P-C-V), which centers on the phenomenon of lived 
experiences and is created in contexts of use, and an access consciousness of value (A-C-V), 
which centers on logic and is based on the perception and introspection derived from choice 
exante and valuation ex-post.  The paradox being, there is truly only one type of value created 
i.e. P-C-V. However, P-C-V sits at the raw experience level and any measurement, assessment or 
evaluation can only capture an A-C-V. Indeed, A-C-V could be mistakenly viewed as a Goods- 
Dominant Logic concept of value as belonging to the essence of the offering, subjectively 
perceived. We argue that it is not. Instead, we argue that the antecedent of A-C-V is in how the 
individual becomes conscious of value. 
By applying theories on information processing (e.g. Epstein,1994; Operario and Fiske, 1999), 
one of the three aspects of consciousness, we reinterpret these two types of consciousness of 
value. As summarised in Table 3, we propose that different information processing systems are 
in operation in a P-C-V and A-C-V. Specifically, we propose that when P-C-V is dominant in 
consumer decision-making i.e. in contexts of use, the low-reach experiential system is active 
but neither the high-reach experiential system or the rational system are. In contrast, when A-
C-V is dominant in consumer decision-making i.e. in evaluation pre- and post-experience, the 
high-reach experiential system and the rational system may be active but the low-reach 
experiential system is not. This has two important implications for the understanding of value in 
service science and management literature in general. 
First, it suggests, unlike the implicit assumption in value literature, that consciousness of value 
is not the same at consumption as at choice because the information processing systems in 
operation are treating the content of the experience differently. 
Second, we identify two types of information system that may be in operation in A-C-V; a 
rational system and a high-reach experiential system.  Arguably, current literature assumes a 
rational system. All the value perspectives, with the potential exception of phenomenological 
as it does not articulate A-C-V, assume that the value of an offering can be rationally evaluated 
and objectively measured and further, that consumers are economic men and rational beings 
making decisions based on logic and reasoning. Although an experiential system may be 
acknowledged in literature, there are no measures of value in management literature which 
successfully incorporate the experiential system. 
Conclusion 
Value and value creation have become the fundamental concepts in management literature for 
decades.  Its definition and measurement have been of great interest both in management and 
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economics. Despite the extant approaches to value, the understanding of value and its creation 
is still fragmented and there is scant literature that sheds light on the underlying assumptions 
of these approaches.  As value creation for consumers is a central function of economic activity, 
a comprehensive understanding of value is essential to customers, businesses and policy 
makers. 
In exploring how consumers might process information for a phenomenal or access 
consciousness of value, we challenge the consciousness assumption identified in value 
literature, proposing that the information processing systems in operation may be different in 
the two states of consciousness and as a result, consumer consciousness of value will be 
different at consumption than in judgment before and after the experience.   
There is still limited understanding of value creation and judgment in service science, and in 
management literature in general. In order to further understanding, research needs to 
acknowledge and challenge the assumptions in the existing literature. Future research would 
investigate the operationalization of the propositions presented here and testing them in an 
experimental setting. 
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Table 1 Values Streams and Value Assumptions  
  Value Streams      
  Utility Monetary worth Perceived 
Satisfaction 
et benefit Means end Phenomenological 
Philosophical 
Assumption 
Assumes the value of an 
offering is in the essence of 
it. 
  
It is created from the 
customer consuming (and 
destroying) the essence of 
the offering. 
  
Assumes the value of 
an offering is a 
willingness-to-pay 
amount at the point of 
choice. 
  
Value is created (for 
the firm) when 
customers buy. 
  
Assumes value of an 
offering is the essence 
of it and the customer 
is a passive consumer. 
  
Value is created when 
it is ‘delivered’ to the 
customer through the 
offering. 
  
Assumes the firm is 
able to promise 
expected value, as 
well as exceed 
expectations of that 
value to customers at 
choice. 
  
Assumes the firm is 
able to (within limits) 
control the affordance 
of the offering and 
context; with agency 
and the resources of 
the customers at 
Assumes value is 
an outcome to be 
predicted by the 
customer at 
choice. 
  
Assumes that, in 
predicting the 
goodness of the 
offering, 
customers 
presuppose a 
predictable and 
consistent set of 
context, agency 
and resources at 
consumption such 
that they can 
make a rational 
assessment of 
expected 
outcomes and 
expected outlays 
of consumption at 
the point of 
Assumes the value of 
an offering is the 
essence of its 
attributes’ fit to 
outcomes in context. 
  
Value is created when 
there is a good fit of 
offering’s attributes 
performance to 
outcomes. 
  
Acknowledges a 
phenomenological value 
of an offering that is 
unique and exists as 
practices and processes 
are enacted with the 
offering within a 
dynamically-constructed 
context. 
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consumption as 
expected and 
predictable for the 
firm to ‘deliver’ 
satisfaction. 
  
choice. 
  
Chronological 
Assumption 
Assumes value (utility) 
upon purchase is the same 
value (utility) obtained 
upon consumption i.e. the 
offering generates the same 
utility (regardless of 
context, agency or 
resources) as expected 
during purchase. 
  
Some literature 
acknowledge subjective 
perception or state-
dependency of utility. 
  
Assumes the 
translation of value to 
willingness-to-pay is 
constant across a 
customer‘s 
consumption life-
time. 
  
Assumes that the 
offering is consistent 
in its affordance, and 
that the ‘goodness’ in 
consuming an 
offering is always in 
the same context, 
with the same 
resources and agency 
for each consumption 
experience such that 
willingness-to-pay for 
offering does not 
change over time. 
  
Also assumes that the 
Acknowledges a 
possible difference in 
perception of value at 
consumption to that 
perceived at choice or 
evaluation. 
  
Assumes benefits 
and outlays 
manifested at 
consumption are 
the same benefits 
and outlays 
predicted by the 
customer at 
choice. 
Acknowledges that the 
value of an offering 
can change based on 
the context at 
consumption but 
assumes that rational 
assessment of 
anticipated use 
situations can be made 
at choice. 
  
Assumes that exchange 
includes an expectation 
of phenomenological 
value creation but does 
not articulate 
relationship between 
phenomenological 
creation of value and an 
assessment of that value 
at the point of choice. 
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offering’s fit towards 
the individual’s 
consumption 
outcomes does not 
change over time. 
Assumes that 
perceived goodness is 
the same for every 
consumption event 
such that the 
customer will 
consistently buy or 
will buy more over 
time. 
  
Consciousness 
assumption 
Assumes the consciousness 
of value (utility) at 
consumption is the same 
consciousness of goodness 
(utility) at choice. 
  
Assumes that the 
awareness of the 
value does not change 
at choice, 
consumption or 
evaluation. 
  
Assumes that the 
consciousness of value 
of the offering is the 
same at choice, 
consumption and 
evaluation (because of 
the philosophical 
assumption of value as 
essence of the 
offering). 
  
Assumes the 
evaluation of the 
outcome is equivalent 
to the evaluation of the 
Assumes that the 
awareness of 
goodness (value) 
at consumption is 
the same 
awareness of 
goodness at 
choice and 
evaluation. 
Assumes offering has 
properties of value 
which are consumed in 
the context of use, 
implying that the 
awareness of goodness 
(value) at consumption 
is the same awareness 
of goodness at choice 
and evaluation. 
  
Assumes that a 
customer’s awareness of 
‘goodness’ within the 
phenomenon experience 
is the same as ex-ante 
and ex-post judgment. In 
other words, judgment 
of goodness is the same 
as the experience of 
goodness. 
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offering as context, 
agency and resources 
are held to be 
predictable and 
constant. 
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Table 2: Experiential and rational systems  
Experiential system  Rational system  
Affective in nature, emotionally-driven 
(Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Novak and 
Hoffman, 2009); associated with affect 
(but not to the exclusion of all non-
affective cognitions) (Epstein, 1994). 
Cognitive in nature (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 
1999; Epstein, 1994) 
At the lower level of operation, 
associated with crude system and rapid 
processing (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999); 
Automatic, holistic and associationistic 
(Novak and Hoffman, 2009; Denes-Rai 
and Epstein, 1994); with less effort, 
efficiently and more simply, to process 
information (Epstein, 1994; Kirkpatrick 
and Epstein, 1992).  
At its higher reaches, and in particularly 
in interaction with the rational system, it 
is a source of intuitive wisdom and 
creativity … schemas inductively derived 
from emotionally significant past 
experiences, it is capable of 
generalization and abstraction through the 
use of prototypes, metaphors, scripts and 
narratives’ (Epstein, 1994, p.715; Denes-
Rai and Epstein, 1994, p.819). 
Operates according to a person’s 
understanding of conventionally 
established rules of logic and evidence 
(Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992, p.534); 
cause and effect (Novak and Hoffman, 
2009).  
 
Outcome-oriented rather than process-
oriented (Novak and Hoffman, 2009; 
Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992). 
Hierarchical, sequential, process oriented 
(Novak and Hoffman, 2009)  
Rapid to implement but slow to change, 
immediate (Novak and Hoffman, 2009). 
Slow to implement but quicker to change 
(Novak and Hoffman, 2009) 
Preconscious and experiences passively 
with the process opaque to the individual 
(Novak and Hoffman, 2009); operates 
automatically outside or at the fringes of 
conscious awareness (Kirkpatrick and 
Primarily conscious analytical system 
(Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994). 
Experienced actively with the individual 
aware of and in control of the process 
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Epstein, 1992, p.534).  (Novak and Hoffman, 2009).  
Represents events in the form of concrete 
exemplars rather than abstract symbols, is 
shaped by emotionally significant past 
experience (Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 
1992, p.534). 
Abstract system … It is capable of very 
high levels of abstraction (Epstein, 1994) 
 
Automatic, holistic and associationistic 
(Novak and Hoffman, 2009; Denes-Rai 
and Epstein, 1994); with less effort, 
efficiently and more simply, to process 
information (Epstein, 1994; Kirkpatrick 
and Epstein, 1992).  
 
Deliberate, effortful (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 
1999; Epstein, 1994); verbally mediated 
(Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994). 
Associated with a more refined and 
deliberate processing (Shiv and 
Fedorikhin, 1999; Epstein, 1994). 
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Table 3 Consciousness, Information processing systems and Value models  
Components of 
Consciousness 
  ACV PCV 
Functions   Integrating a lot 
of information  
 
 
 
No causal roles 
for information 
processing  
Computation ot in the scope 
of this paper 
 - - 
Information 
Processing 
Rational system  P3 P5 
 Experiential 
system 
High reach P2 P5 
  Low reach P4 P1 
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